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I
The 'state' in China needs definition. China, like all
other communist countries, is governed not through
institutions legitimised by the state constitution, but
by a single party which can dictate to state organs.
Thus the retreat of the state in certain fields need not
be paralleled by a retreat of the party and may even be
accompanied by an increase in party, as opposed to
state, control, as during the Great Leap Forward. And
while the state apparatus, if it is to function, must
adopt rules which limit its actions, the party is under
no such self-limitation. When it takes over the
functions of the state it can behave in much more
arbitrary ways.
Communist parties indeed emphasise that they are
above the law; the law serves the revolution and the
party guides the revolution. This attitude has been
strengthened by China's own traditional hostility to
codified law. As a result, in China even more than in
the European communist countries, party policy
statements frequently serve in place of law, and many
fundamental rights are not legally defined.
The party is only the greatest of China's quasi-state
organisations. In the economic field, in addition to
state trading organs and state banks, the rural supply-
and-marketing and credit cooperatives, although
formally not part of the state apparatus, have hitherto
functioned entirely as if they were. In fact in 1977 the
supply-and-marketing cooperatives were formally
made state organs. Most important of all, the
agricultural collectives themselves (as in other
communist countries), although in theory they are
cooperatives voluntarily created and self-governing,
have been operated as if they were state enterprises -
with the notable difference that they are responsible
for their own losses.
It is through these parastatal organisations that the
state is in touch with the rural population. The
communes have been especially ambiguous; for while
in respect of their economic functions they were
ostensibly cooperatives, as political and administrative
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bodies they almost immediately came to represent a
new and lower level of state bureaucracy, with their
theoretically elected functionaries on the state pay
roll. In this way, for the first time in Chinese history
the state apparatus penetrated the villages. Even the
lower level of cooperative organisation, the production
brigade, was in a similarly ambiguous position. Its
primary function was to ensure the fulfilment of the
state plan; little in the way of resources remained for
activities not dictated from above. It was told not only
what to plant but when.
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This assimilation of all decision-making power by the
party hierarchy has been common to all Soviet-
derived socialism; in fact, such dictatorial control was
made necessary by certain policy assumptions from
which Soviet collectivisation began..There were three
such assumptions: first, that the large-scale mechanised
farming of the United States was the most efficient in
all circumstances; second, that capital for industriali-
sation could only be raised, as (it was wrongly
believed) it had been raised in Britain's industrial
revolution, by a process of 'primitive accumulation 'at
the expense of the peasants; and third, that the
collective organisation of farm labour, as opposed to
the infrastructure of farming, had some sort of
intrinsic 'socialist' moral value. None of these
assumptions is self-evident, to say the least.
However, if agricultural policy is to be based on
expropriating peasants to force them into large-scale
farming, squeezing their incomes to pay lr
industrialisation, and subjecting them to a collective
labour discipline which may actually be counter-
productive, then dictatorship must follow. The
authoritarian system once established creates its own
vested interests, which are then rationalised in the
insistence that the original dubious policy assumptions
are part of ideology. The economic and political
systems thus become mutually supporting.
Il
The first attempt made by the Chinese Communist
Party to break out of the application to agriculture of
centralised economic command, and to create an
alternative to Stalinist agriculture, was in the form of
the Great Leap Forward and the commune system.
The rationale of these revolutionary changes, as far as
Mao himself is concerned, can be summed up as
follows:
Mao condemned Soviet squeezing of agriculture to
finance industrialisation. He condemned the idea
that the development of heavy industry must have
absolute priority in investment, and insisted that
agriculture must come first, then light industry,
believing that the increase of peasant purchasing
power was the real key to development. He accused
Stalin of neglecting individual incentives and over-
stressing collective incentives. He accused him of
having eliminated the masses from economic
decision-making. He repudiated Stalin's insistence
that socialist society is without conflict, argued that
conflict was the necessary motive force of change
and accepted that there were conflicts of interest
between state and collective and between collective
and individual. He argued that in China's
economic conditions the market must play a
greater role than in the Soviet Union and that
producers' goods as well as consumers' goods must
be bought and sold rather than allocated. He
insisted on the importance of the diversification of
agriculture and of the rural economy, and he saw
the development of rural industries as the main
means of accumulating the capital necessary to
transform agriculture. He was the first to see that
the original large-scale commune of 1958, which
brought rich and poor villages into a single unit of
account and distribution, was unacceptable to the
more prosperous villages; hence the creation of the
three-level system with the small production team
as the main unit of ownership. He roundly
condemned the coercive allocation of peasant
resources by county and commune cadres in the
Great Leap, and defended peasant resistance to
this 'banditry'. He insisted that agricultural
planning should be indicative, not authoritative, so
that grass-roots economic decision-making would
become a reality. He asked for, but never got,
proper and regular election of commune, brigade
and team cadres.
[Feuchtwang and Hussain 1983: 154-51
In adjusting intersectoral priorities, however, Mao's
intention was not to make drastic changes in the
allocation of central investment funds between heavy
industry and agriculture: first, because the central
budget in China represents only one level of
investment, and investment in agriculture increases as
a proportion of the total as one moves down to
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province and thence to the county (xian); second,
because Chinese agriculture in 1958 had not reached
the stage at which it could absorb massive increases in
state investment; third, because Mao believed that it
would be more efficient, as well as less bureaucratic, to
make it possible for the rural communities to save and
invest for themselves out of their (putatively)
increasing incomes by keeping land tax and
procurement norms sufficiently low to leave room for
local accumulation, and then to enhance this
possibility through the development of local collective
industries and other enterprises. Conversely, state-
sector industry was expected to respond to the
demands created by rural industrialisation. These
ideas were the basis of the Great Leap Forward and
the communes of 1958.
The Great Leap and the communes were a tragic
failure, economically disastrous and politically
intolerable; but the reason for failure did not lie in the
economic ideas of the Leap - the use of rural surplus
labour to develop rural infrastructure and village
industries. The reasons for failure were political.
Given the existence of the authoritarian party/state
structure, the new opportunities for local community
decision-making and enterprise were pre-empted by
the authorities. Ironically, the command economy was
thrust right down to the village level, where peasant
property and resources were allocated by the cadres as
if they were the property of the state.
The irony extended to most of the individual features
of the commune/Great Leap system [Brugger
1977:149ff). In the attempt to give the villages the
means to develop agriculture and light industry for
themselves, they were induced to try to concentrate on
small-scale heavy industries, especially iron and steel
making, and through this attempt Stalin's priority to
heavy industry was reasserted in the very village itself,
in wasteful and irrational forms symbolised by the
'backyard blast furnace'. In the attempt at rapid
development of village industries, a higher rate of
squeeze than ever was imposed on agriculture for local
investment. In the overstrained drive to transform
rural China in three years, individual material
incentives, whose importance Mao had declared that
Stalin neglected, were almost totally eliminated. The
conflict of interest between state and collective and
between collective and individual, which Mao had
stressed as both inevitable and creative, was totally
ignored. The market dimension of the rural sector
shrank instead of growing. The obsession with grain
monoculture grew to new heights and prevented the
diversification of production which was fundamental
to the Great Leap strategy. The commune, in theory a
higher form of democratic, self-managing collective,
became a new state instrument. Agricultural planning,
so far from becoming indicative, became more
authoritarian than ever. The whole process, the major
premise of which had been the necessity for local
democratic economic decision-making as the source
of new consciousness and new motivation, turned into
an exercise in commandism paralleled only by the
Soviet collectivisation drive.
The most striking distortion of the original policies of
the Great Leap was the fact that the newly established
communes, which were intended to be superior
collectives, were merged with the local political
administration. Their leaders being state employees,
the state paid the piper and therefore called the tune,
and the commune became little more than a
transmission belt for conveying government orders to
the villages.
There is another aspect of the theory of the communes
which added to the confusion. The Chinese name
gongshe is not an old Chinese word. It was invented to
refer specifically to the Paris Commune of 1871. The
ideological implications of its use in 1958 are obvious,
and are of great importance for Chinese theories of the
state.
The theme of the first book on socialism which the
young Mao Zedong read, Kirkup's History of
Handicrafts in a Chinese commune.
Socialism, was precisely the contradiction in socialist
minds between étatisme and communalism, between
Saint Simon and Robert Owen, a contradiction which
Marx and Engels left unresolved. Mao was on the side
of Owen; in fact, if the characteristics of an Owenite
community listed in Kirkup's book are compared with
the original characteristics of the Chinese commune,
the parallel is extraordinary. From the beginning, the
commune was regarded therefore not simply as a new
tier of economic organisation, but as a new form of
community, a substitute for 'bourgeois state'
institutions. But this did not prevent it from being
assimilated to the existing Chinese state, against which
it could bring no countervailing power.
I"
In the reaction which followed the collapse of the
Leap, when most of the new village industries were
condemned and closed down, and when the great
labour-intensive water conservancy schemes of 1958-
59 had been discredited, the commune actually lost in
practice most of the economic functions it had first
been designed to fulfil; it became more than ever
simply the lowest rung in the hierarchy of state
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territorial administration. Had this been the whole
story, the results might have been better. But the
presumption was retained that the commune had the
right and the duty to raise revenue from its members
for economic development, ostensibly by democratic
decision, but in fact largely on orders from the xian
government.
In the interval between the end of the Leap in 1960 and
the Cultural Revolution, the Liu Shaoqi regime
reverted to the norms of state socialism, but with
modifications broadly similar to those which were
being attempted in Eastern Europe and to a certain
extent in the Soviet Union itself. As far as agriculture is
concerned, the unit of cultivation and of distribution
of income was reduced from commune to production
brigade and then to the production team of 30 or 40
families. A larger private sector of agriculture was
permitted, with increased private plots and more
freedom for rural fairs. Indeed in the desperate
circumstances which succeeded the Leap and the
adverse weather conditions of 1960 and 1961 which
exacerbated the problems of agriculture, in some
places the party even tolerated a regression to private
farming and private land reclamation. At the same
time the new village industries, centre and symbol of
Maoist rural policy, were for the most part abolished
as inefficient and wasteful, while agricultural
mechanisation and the ownership and operation of
agricultural machinery was resumed by the state.
Mao condemned the new policies as 'revisionist'. In
his analysis of revisionism, he saw Stalin (para-
doxically) as its author [Joint Publications Research
Service 1974:129]. Stalin's system prevented popular
participation; mass management gave way to
coercion. Khrushchev partially substituted the carrot
for the stick, but nothing else changed. Popular
participation remained minimal. Liu Shaoqi seemed
to be prepared to accept the same in China, and even
to encourage it. The result, to Mao, was the creation of
a new 'red bourgeoisie'.
The left-wing alternative was to restore Great Leap
decentralisation. But there were changes. First, the
writers and educators who had led the public
condemnation of the Great Leap in the early 1960s
had to be countered. Second, the political leaders who
were content to operate the state-socialist system must
be made to see the error of their ways. Third. and most
important, the party cadres whose arbitrary power
had distorted the Great I.eap must be put under the
supervision of the masses.
For some months in late 1966 it looked as if the party.
and perhaps even the state as it existed, would
disappear when Shanghai set up a Paris-Commune
government. This was accompanied by 'seizures of
power' in enterprises, ministries and institutions of all
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kinds, in order to destroy hierarchical authority and
replace it with mass management.
Mao, however, drew back from the brink and refused
to approve of the Shanghai Commune. He preferred
the creation of 'revolutionary committees' in which
representatives of the left wing, soldiers and
reconstructed party cadres were associated.
The Great Leap process was nevertheless begun again.
In particular, commune industries grew rapidly until
they became an essential part of the rural economy.
Since the death of Mao in September 1976 and the
arrest of the Gang of Four, rural policies associated
with the left have been subjected to trenchant criticism
[BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts; US, Foreign
Broadcast Inform alion Servicel. First, it is asserted that
left-wing control has in the past been associated with
low levels of growth in agriculture. Grain output in
1960 after the failure of the Leap was less than in 1951.
From 1962 to 1965, when right-wing policies were
applied, annual growth soared to 6.7 per cent per
annum. When the left again took over it sank to 4.5 per
cent.
The concentration on self-sufficiency in grain not only
limited supplies of other products but deprived
peasants of other possible sources of earnings and so
depressed both incomes and savings. It also damaged
the ecology.
Massively increased local investment in agriculture
gave only poor returns. While farm costs rose between
1965 and 1977 by 130 per cent, production rose only 80
per cent, and in many places peasant incomes actually
fell although production increased.
The burdens on the peasants were increasingly heavy.
On average about 30 per cent of gross production was
deducted, including the collectives' own accumulation
for investment and welfare, before distribution of the
product, a figure not very different from the burden of
rent before the revolution. This was the result of
uncontrolled investment, the absence of accounting
and the swollen numbers of cadres drawing high
salaries.
There was much arbitrary reallocation of peasant
resources: 'in violation of exchange at equal value
some state organs, enterprises, departments and units
transfer the resources of teams and appropriate
labour, grain, funds and materials' [Foreign Broadcast
Information Service, 253/L42, 1980]. Every attempt to
create a system of rational rewards for farm labour
had failed because 'for most of the year farm tasks
cannot be expressed in terms of output' [Foreign
Broadcast Information Service, 044/Ql. 1981]. The
result of all this was an absence of incentives to work.
'Who wants to do unprofitable labour?' said the
peasants. 'The women made sandals, the men loafed
[Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 238/W2,
1981]. At the same time productivity on the private
plot was much higher than on the collective fields.
This indictment of the rural policies of the cultural-
revolution leaders by their successors must be treated
with some caution. Chinese agriculture certainly did
suffer from all these disadvantages and difficulties, but
their extent and their severity are not known. They did
not all originate from the cultural revolution, and they
did not prevent a steady rise in agricultural production
(said to be 4.5 per cent per annum) quite comparable
to that which had occurred from 1962 to 1965, when
one allows for the fact that the much higher rate of
growth now claimed for these years (6.7 per cent)
partly represented a recovery from the near-famine
conditions of 1959-61.
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In the past the state, or the party replacing the state, or
in the cultural revolution the insurgent revolutionary
committees replacing the party, have exercised great
authority over village production. Under all these
various dispensations, whatever the differences in
their theoretical aims, the command economy has
commanded right down to the grass roots. The
resources and the energies of the village have been
almost wholly absorbed in fulfilling detailed plans
imposed from above. Production has been organised
under the direct management of the team or brigade
leaders.
Deng Xiaoping's answer is the contract, Its use enables
state authority to retreat from production and to leave
the producers, collective or individual, to employ their
resources as they think best to meet their contractual
obligations; having done so, they can use their surplus
resources in whatever way - subject to certain
constraints of public policy - is most profitable.
Whether Deng's contract system will work as intended
depends of course on the nature of the contract. To
reach its aims, it must be such as to leave the
contractor with some resources to spare after meeting
his obligations, and it must be enforceable in the
courts on the basis of a system of law of contract. So
far neither of these criteria has been completely met.
Local cadres who are hostile to the new policies can,
and frequently do, force contract stipulations so high
as virtually to perpetuate the old system. Contract law,
though emphatically promised, has not yet appeared.
The system still operates only on party policy as
locally enforced. It may be added that in the absence of
firm contract law tested by the courts there is also little
guarantee that the contract system will not operate
cumulatively to the advantage of a more prosperous
minority.
The advantages of this system, according to its
creators, are numerous. Individual incentives are
maximised, but planning retained. Management of
farming by the cadres, whose competence to manage is
in doubt, is minimised. Responsibilities are clearly
defined. Accounting is simplified. Specialised division
of labour is made possible.
Commune and brigade enterprises are now also being
handled in the same way as agriculture. Hitherto they
were managed as branches of the collective. They now
contract to transmit a fixed amount of profit to the
collective, retaining the rest for investment and bonus
distribution. They have in effect (though not in law)
ceased to be owned by the collective and are owned
instead by their workers.
The flexibility of this system is such that the commune
structure inherited from the Great Leap is no longer
seen to be of importance, and its vices have come to
loom larger than its virtues [Foreign Broadcast
Information Service, 048/L2, 1981; GuangmingRibao,
6 November 1979]. Its amirable internal flexibility in
allowing different tasks to be undertaken at three
different levels of collective organisation, its capacity
to mobilise local resources, and its potential to
respond politically to the economic and social needs of
its members seemed to its critics to have been negated
by centralised state-party control which in practice
made it extremely inflexible and unresponsive. Again
the criticisms seem to be valid, but at the same time
much exaggerated. However, since 1981 in fact
preparations have been under way to abolish it. The
first and simplest change is to remove from the
commune the political authority which it has enjoyed,
while retaining its economic functions. Hitherto,
however, the commune has carried out its economic
functions largely by the use of its political authority.
With that authority removed, it needs a new
relationship with lower-level institutions. The most
common of the experimental solutions so far has been
to reconstitute it as an 'agricultural-industrial-
commercial trust' whose constituent firms are the
agricultural teams and the commune and brigade
industries. As an enterprise, it is responsible for its
own profits and losses.
These changes, when they are applied throughout
China, will represent a vast process of privatisation. It
is, however, socialist privatisation, for the unit of
ownership is still the collective.
The changes have been made possible by the
repudiation in China of the three policy assumptions
concerning socialist agriculture which were recalled at
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the beginning of this article. Mao Zedong began the
attack on them by repudiating the theory of pimitive
accumulation and insisting that increasing peasant
purchasing power was the real motive force of Chinese
development.
However, under Mao the other two shibboleths -
belief in the economies of scale of collective
agriculture and in the moral necessity of collective
production - remained unquestioned. Now they too
have been repudiated. It is recognised that in the
present conditions of Chinese agiculture family-scale
farming is still the most efficient for most purposes
and in most places. It is also asserted that the question
of the organisation of day-to-day production is not a
question of ideological principle but simply of
practical efficiency.
Contract is a phenomenon of the market, and its use in
China is part of a process of relaxing central planning
in favour of market relations. By 1982, 80 per cent of
the produce of commune and brigade enterprises was
outside the plan, white agriculture is now (in theory at
least) subjected only to indicative planning backed by
price and taxation policies. This, however, is
misleading if it suggests the dominance of free
markets. These are still marginal. The purchasers of
rural produce are mainly monopsonistic state trading
organs, parastatal supply-and-marketing cooperatives.
state department stores in the cities, state sector
industrial enterprises and the foreign trade com-
mission. They buy on contract. The prices are fixed,
and competition is confined to quality and design.
The new agricultural system could be largely nullified
if the contracts awarded to peasant families and work
groups were tightened up, so that all their available
resources were employed in meeting their obligations.
This is not merely theoretical; it is the normal way in
which local leaders who are hostile to the new system
try to beat it.
This brings us to the question of the protection of the
rights and interests of rural producers. There has been
enormous emphasis on this [Foreign Broadcast
Information Service, 1 l8/K9, 1981], but so far
legislation, although promised, has not been published
and protection still depends on party documents. This
has three dangers. First, party policy may change, as
Chinese peasants know. Second, local party cadres
can often interpret policy to suit themselves. Third,
redress for wrongs must generally be sought from the
party, not in the courts, and party cadres have means
of retaliating against their accusers. Until there is
adequate law on contracts and on the requisition of
labour and other resources from the production teams
and the collective enterprises, the new developments
could be reversed at will.
16
V
Finally, let us look at the changes in China in a wider
perspective. Do they express, implicitly at least, a new
theory of the socialist state?
It is possible that the relinquishment of the 'three
shibboleths' in China has now made authoritarian
control of agriculture unnecessary. If this is so, the
relations between the state and rural society may well
move in a direction more consonant with China's own
political traditions.
At a central committee meeting Mao once defined the
role of the state/party leadership as follows: 'Our job
is to produce ideas and employ cadres'. Now that is
not a definition of government which would ever have
entered the head of a western statesman, communist
or non-communist. It is absolutely Chinese; mutatis
mutandis, the Kang Xi Emperor would have been quite
happy with it. We can be sure that Mao's audience
automatically responded by locating his definition on
the familiar Chinese spectrum that runs from Legalist
maximal government to Taoist minimal government.
We can also be sure that those who, like Mao, had read
Kirkup in their youth would have assimilated the
Legalist-Taoist dichotomy to that of state socialism
versus communalist socialism. And we can be sure
that many responded positively when Mao thus
unconsciously reaffirmed traditional expectations
concerning the role of government.
When we look back on the history of Chinese
twentieth century radicalism generally, what is most
striking about it is the bias towards communalism,
narodnism, anarchism. Chinese radical prescriptions
for development were concerned with the self-renewal
of the village, in which the state was expected to act as
a catalyst to stimulate mass consciousness. The
activity of the government was not expected to pre-
empt local initiative, only to encourage, guide and
protect it.
tn these respects Mao was in the mainstream of
Chinese radical thought. In one sense he was also still
in the mainstream of traditional government. In
imperial China the relation between government
authority and social institutions was summed up in
such phrases as 'government supervision, popular
management', 'central supervision, local manage-
ment', 'official supervision, merchant management'
and other similar formulae. Mao Zedong defined the
system of the wartime Border Region in the same
terms: 'central supervision, local management'. In
1958, via the commune system, he sought to reassert
this concept, but without real success. Now in the
abolition of the commune. Deng Xiaoping aims to get
rid of it as having become a bureaucratic obstacle to
the realisation of this traditionally sanctioned
relationship between state and society.
It is thus possible that the Chinese are returning, albeit
unconsciously, to their own traditions of government,
as far as relations with rural China are concerned. If
so, one should bear in mind, however, that China's
imperial governments were seldom able to resist in
practice the temptation to turn the government-
supervised voluntary associations into new organs of
surveillance and control. The tradition is double-
edged.
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